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This background paper presents considerations on how the COVID-19 pandemic is accentuating existing 
vulnerabilities of populations forcibly displaced by war (refugees, asylum-seekers, internally-displaced and 
stateless persons), in settings across East Africa and the Middle East. In addition to the devastating health 
threat the pandemic poses, lockdown measures imposed by governments to reduce transmission are having 
outsized effects on forcibly displaced populations, further entrenching poverty, xenophobia and creating 
new humanitarian protection issues. With the exceptional physical distancing requirements of this pandemic 
adding impetus to a global drive towards the localisation of humanitarian responses, we also describe some 
of the local responses to COVID-19 mounted by forcibly displaced communities and humanitarian actors 
early in the epidemic. We end by offering suggestions for how greater inclusion could help address 
vulnerabilities of displaced people to COVID-19. 
This background paper is based on a rapid review of existing published and grey literature and personal 
communication with humanitarian actors, social scientists and representatives of local organisations working 
in diverse settings of displacement in the Middle East and East Africa. It was developed for the Social Science 
in Humanitarian Action Platform (SSHAP) by the RECAP project at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical 
Medicine (led by Diane Duclos and Jennifer Palmer).
Summary considerations on the ways humanitarian actors, civil society organisations and government 
departments with specific responsibilities towards displaced people can lessen vulnerabilities in this 
pandemic are available in a summary paper: Operational considerations: COVID-19 and forced displacement 
in the Middle East & East Africa 
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BACKGROUND AND SCOPE 
According to the most recent estimates of displacement, there are 79.5 million people forcibly displaced by 
conflict in the world, including 45.7 internally displaced persons (IDPs), 26 million refugees and 4.2 million 
asylum seekers. 73% of people displaced across borders live in countries neighbouring their countries of 
origin,1 meaning that conflict tends to affect health and social care systems in wide geographic regions. 
Despite international calls for a unilateral ceasefire in ongoing conflicts to enable COVID-19 disease control,2 
most wars in the Middle East and Africa have not ceased.3 While the adoption of travel restrictions and 
border closures to reduce the spread of COVID-19 has slowed much migration globally, forced displacement 
continues within conflict-affected states and across borders, as does the need to provide humanitarian 
protection and assistance to refugees, IDPs, asylum-seekers and stateless persons.4 
Entrenched conflicts in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, as well as South Sudan, Somalia and eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo profoundly shape patterns of mobility in the Middle East and East Africa over 
generations, affecting coping strategies of people who decide to leave and those who stay, of people who 
are internally displaced and those who cross international borders. Responses to COVID-19 should consider 
the specific and varied types of settings occupied by displaced people in their migrations, as well as the 
diverse ways people migrate. 
This background paper has five sections outlining 1) the diversity of forced migration contexts, 2) an overview 
of COVID-19 epidemics in humanitarian settings, 3) how COVID-19 is accentuating vulnerabilities of forcibly 
displaced populations across East Africa and the Middle East, 4) opportunities and challenges in the 
localisation of COVID-19 responses and 5) recommendations on how to address COVID-19 vulnerabilities in 
displaced populations. 
DIVERSE FORMS OF DISPLACEMENT  
During war time, the ability to move is key for populations’ quest for survival and security. Forced 
displacement also triggers new vulnerabilities, and therefore new migration flows. Below are some key 
considerations about the types of spaces displaced people occupy on their journeys, reasons and ways 
people decide to move between them, as well as how people create a new sense of home in temporary and 
long-term sites of displacement. 
Types of accommodation: Camps and settlements with their orderly rows of tents or huts are iconic of 
refugee and IDP spaces.5 However, accommodation types where forcibly displaced people live are highly 
diverse, ranging from tented and highly-fortified camps, temporary transit and detention centres, 
unsheltered temporary arrangements, self-settled villages or neighbourhoods, rented private 
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accommodations or in temporary structures on unused land in towns and cities among ‘host’ populations 
who have not been displaced by fighting.  
Settlement locations: Refugee and IDP spaces can be located near borders, at the outskirts of cities, or in 
urban neighbourhoods including slums. In Uganda, for example, which hosts the largest population of 
refugees in Africa, most of the 1.35 million registered refugees from South Sudan, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Burundi, Somalia and other countries are in village-like open settlements managed by UNHCR 
near borders. Tens of thousands also forgo official assistance, choosing to move to towns and cities where 
they often have uncertain legal status but may find more opportunities to eke out a living.6-7 
Evolutions of settlements: In Lebanon, which hosts the largest proportion of refugees globally compared to 
the size of its own population, collections of tented accommodation structures built for long-term refugees 
from Palestine have slowly transformed into semi-permanent homes and neighbourhoods, bringing 
profound spatial changes to camps as emergency responses have turned into protracted situations.8 
Following the largescale conflict in Syria, many Syrian refugees and Palestinian refugees who had been living 
there have chosen to settle in the Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon, for affordability of rent as well as 
available social networks.9-10 
Circular migrations: Migration routes may also be circular with the same journeys happening multiple times, 
following the ebb and flow of conflict and the evolution of other stresses, bureaucratic changes in access to 
residency and work permits, as well as opportunities to access aid. During these movements, people often 
enter new categories of displacement such as ‘IDP’, ‘asylum-seeker’, ‘refugee’, ‘returnee’ and ‘labour 
migrant’ with different accompanying rights. For example, while labour migration between Lebanon and 
Syria has historically been quite fluid, the influx of refugees fleeing the war in Syria has led to restrictions to 
access the Lebanese territory, and since 2015, renewing residency has become more difficult. This has forced 
Syrians in Lebanon to either stay in place and grapple with work and service restrictions as undocumented 
migrants and refugees or to keep moving: back to conflict-affected regions or on to new destinations. 
Migrating with (and without) others: The forced or unplanned nature of much migration in wartime means 
that many communities move en masse, navigating migration and resettlement decisions together. 
Nevertheless, families may ‘break-up’ for many reasons during war-time, both through involuntary 
separation because of attacks but also as a result of rational assessments of the different needs members 
have for protection and their capacities to pursue opportunities and access resources on behalf of the family 
or community. Those in privileged positions (for example, those with links to military elite, faith-based or 
humanitarian organisations, or with more money for private transportation) often have greater access to 
more secure places.11 Migrants may also use social media information from trusted individuals to plan their 
journey.12 Men and boys are generally more mobile so might be better able to travel long distances to safe 
spaces, to pursue livelihood opportunities in cities or be expected to travel with armies to fight. Since camps 
usually offer free education, they may be seen as good places for children. Older people less fit to travel may 
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be left behind or extended families may see advantages in organising some households to protect existing 
land, houses or businesses. Those sent away often join existing communities of displaced people with shared 
languages, cultures or histories who, in turn, may help more migrants navigate their ways there.11 
Hybrid authorities and plural cultures of displacement: Through processes of place- and home-making, 
displaced people create new cultures and systems which enable communal healing, coping and 
resocialisation.11,13 Very often, the places where forcibly displaced people settle become sites of plural or 
hybrid authorities. Humanitarian programmes, religious organisations, elders' committees and customary 
courts, political and civil society organisations and local financing cooperatives operate alongside each other, 
offering various opportunities for leadership and participation, including in collaborating with public health 
interventions. 
 
COVID-19 IN DISPLACEMENT SETTINGS 
In the first quarter of 2020, as the epidemic looked set to affect all regions of the globe, crisis-affected 
populations, particularly those living in refugee and IDP camps were among the first groups international 
public health responses prioritised for preparedness efforts. In the second quarter, public health 
preparedness activities across humanitarian settings in the Middle East and East Africa have consisted of:  
◼ Community engagement and COVID-19 education; 
◼ Reinforcement and expansion of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure by constructing 
hand-washing points in communal areas (in markets, at health facilities, at settlement gates) and 
increasing supplies of water and soap in camps and settlements; 
◼ Organising community groups to sew washable face masks; 
◼ Adapting essential humanitarian services normally delivered using mass gatherings, including food 
distributions, to suit physical distancing requirements of COVID-19 control; 
◼ Adopting remote and community-based models of delivery for some health services; 
◼ Training of staff and equipping health facilities to improve infection control and COVID-19 case 
management capabilities; and 
◼ Construction, renovation or conversion of existing structures into COVID-19 quarantine or isolation 
units; 
As of June 2020, there has been no large-scale outbreak amongst IDP and refugee populations in countries 
considered for this brief in either region, though local transmission is ongoing in all countries of the Middle 
East and North Africa, the East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region.14-15 Moreover, most 
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humanitarian responses have struggled to address both the medical needs associated with what are 
predicted to be very large epidemics of COVID-19 and the vulnerabilities associated with government 
response measures adopted in areas where humanitarian programmes operate. Government control 
measures were adopted swiftly across the Middle East and East Africa at a relatively early stage in the 
epidemic, causing so much hardship and disruption to daily life that in some places they have even eased up 
before the epidemics have really gotten underway.16  
Given this context of low COVID-19 caseload but high preventive measure intensity, the main vulnerabilities 
being experienced to date have been due to border closures, travel restrictions, interruptions to businesses 
and schools, prohibitions on large gatherings, curfews and mandatory stay-at-home orders - a collection of 
measures which constrain mobility and are referred to collectively as ‘lockdowns’. 
VULNERABILITY TO COVID-19 IN DISPLACEMENT 
The COVID-19 pandemic has compounded insecurity and vulnerability for forcibly displaced populations on 
multiple inter-connected fronts, including by harming survival strategies. 
THREATS FROM COVID-19 TRANSMISSION 
Large-scale outbreaks of disease in refugee and IDP camps in the past prompted the introduction of minimum 
standards for the provision of housing, water and sanitation infrastructure and essential hygiene items to 
slow and control disease transmission in humanitarian responses since the 1990s.17 In many humanitarian 
settings, however, access to land constrains the space that is available to meet such minimum standards. 
Even when space is more plentiful, outbreaks still occur.18 For a disease as infectious as COVID-19, following 
the recommended basic protective measures, including frequent handwashing, maintaining physical 
distances, and isolating at home when sick is likely to be very difficult in camps and settlements. Some 
humanitarian actors are facilitating discussions with camp residents to reimagine living spaces to shield 
vulnerable people from transmission, though the constraints they face shouldn’t be under-estimated. 
Population and housing density in IDP and refugee settlements is often higher than in surrounding host 
communities. Population and housing density in IDP and refugee settlements is often higher than in 
surrounding host communities. In North-West Syria,a between 6 and 11 people who have been repeatedly 
displaced may share a small tent, caravan or one-room-shelter within larger formal or informal settlements. 
Most families share latrines with other households, sometimes having to queue for 30 minutes. Obtaining 
 
a Study conducted by LSHTM and NUS School of Public Health Syria Research Group on the perceptions and experience of displaced 
people living in settlements in Syria. 
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soap can be a challenge. In this region, disease modellers have adopted an assumption that the COVID-19 
attack rate will double every 2.3 days, compared to every 4 days for the surrounding population, and infect 
20% of the IDP population within the first 6 weeks (causing 240,000 cases and 14,328 deaths) compared to 
0.4% of the surrounding host population (16,384 cases, 978 deaths) within the first 8 weeks.19 In South Sudan 
Protection of Civilian (POC) camps set-up in UN peace-keeping compounds, for example, space is so scarce 
that some people have been temporarily housed in stifling warehouses.20 Residents have also often been 
told that they must accommodate eight people in one tent, meaning that some people are asked to share 
with strangers or relatives that it is culturally inappropriate to live with. 
In urban areas where many refugees self-settle such as Kampala, Uganda, more than 70% of households 
sleep in a single room.21 Just over half of Africa’s urban population of 500 million has access to piped water.21 
Shelter is one of the highest burdens on displaced people, hosts and aid providers’ financial resources, and 
affects security and health.22 Loss of income due to COVID-19 may expose displaced people living in rented 
accommodation to a heightened risk of eviction and the possibility that people would have to travel or move 
in with other people, further increasing transmission risks.  
THREATS FROM COVID-19 MEDICAL COMPLICATIONS AND DISRUPTIONS TO HEALTH SERVICES 
The health of people who migrate depends greatly on structural and political factors that determine the 
impetus for migration, the conditions of their journey, and their destination.23 Displaced people of all ages 
are more likely to suffer from poor health than non-displaced people, particularly when they have been 
uprooted for a long time and live in severe conditions. While it is not yet clear what the medical effects of 
COVID-19 will be in low income and humanitarian settings, forcibly displaced people are expected to be at 
higher risk of developing severe disease. Globally, older people and those with underlying medical problems 
like cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease, and cancer are more likely to develop 
serious illness from COVID-19 and die from the disease. Most forcibly displaced populations have the benefit 
of younger age distributions,24 however, they face additional risks of severe disease because of COVID-19’s 
interaction with highly prevalent co-morbidities. These include non-communicable diseases such as 
hypertension and diabetes which are often more prevalent in low- than high-income settings, with a far 
lower treatment coverage, as well as undernutrition, tuberculosis and HIV.25 Mal- and under-nutrition, which 
is particularly prevalent among young and older IDPs, is a major contributor to higher mortality rates among 
IDPs than the general population in most humanitarian crises.22 
While most cases of COVID-19 among displaced populations detected to date appear to have been managed 
in dedicated hospital quarantine and isolation facilities,26 such facilities are expected to become shortly 
overwhelmed. Forcibly displaced peoples’ abilities to manage co-morbidities, diagnose COVID-19 infections, 
monitor need for higher level interventions and receive intensive care for severe complications will be 
affected by their overall access to healthcare. Displaced peoples’ access to services outside of settlements is 
typically beset by difficulties navigating, reaching and paying for healthcare services and communicating with 
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healthcare providers amidst fragmented landscapes of care.23 In such circumstances, displaced populations 
in both the Middle East and East Africa may be expected to rely heavily on local and transnational cultural 
and linguistic social networks which share practical information about how best to access health services27 
and help fund healthcare-seeking.28 29 The greater interventional capabilities of delivering outreach and 
home-based services to populations in camps and settlements may enable implementation of decentralised 
case management services for COVID-19,30 if such an approach is eventually adopted. Challenges in 
coordinating activities across government and humanitarian programmes, however, should be anticipated.31  
Moreover, evidence from previous epidemics, including Ebola outbreaks in West Africa and the DRC, has 
highlighted the excess mortality and morbidity caused by the suspension of routine essential health services 
when a system is overwhelmed by epidemic response. Indirect deaths can exceed those attributed to the 
infectious disease.32, 33, 34 In Lebanon, where most hospital care is privatised, refugees tend to use the main, 
public hospital in Beirut for their services. However, according to some local observers, its allocation and 
reputation as a facility to quarantine and treat COVID-19 patients led to a decrease in health services 
utilisation, with unknown effects on refugee health and health-seeking. Elsewhere in East Africa, isolation 
units built to contain recent epidemics of cholera and Ebola have been repurposed for COVID-19 control. 
INDIRECT HEALTH EFFECTS OF COVID-19 LOCKDOWNS 
Difficulty of reaching and closure of health facilities: In Jordan and Uganda, temporary movement 
restrictions severely hampered refugee and host populations' access to key health services, including for 
chronic diseases.35  
Gender-based violence: During pandemics, as in other types of crises, women may be exposed to greater 
violence, including in their roles as healthcare workers.36 South Sudanese refugees and humanitarian actors 
in Uganda worry that COVID-19 measures are risking gender-based violence and early marriages, both 
because of the ways programmes are being interrupted and because of the inevitability that lockdown 
measures will push women and families into further poverty, with early marriage historically used as a coping 
measure in moments of crisis and poverty.  
Mental health: The psychological impact of being unable to work, attend school or access care because of 
COVID-19, feeling disconnected from others, movement restrictions as well as the stigma and violence 
associated with their enforcement (discussed below) is likely to increase anxiety, depression and other forms 
of distress that displaced people are already at higher risk of.37 Anxiety about COVID-19 may be further 
compounded by the challenges displaced people face accessing public health information because of a lack 
of internet connectivity in some camps or settlements or when information is not available in the languages 
displaced people speak.38 In Iraq, 49% of IDPs surveyed in sites across the country reported psychological 
trauma, stress and anxiety since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.39 Since lockdown measures began, 
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UNHCR has noted higher reports of gender-based violence and attempted and completed suicides in 
Ugandan settlements compared to this time last year.40  
 
THREATS TO SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 
With armed conflict set to continue, inter-related conflict-epidemic dynamics may further impede access for 
internally displaced people to reach care. Providing humanitarian assistance to populations is dependent on 
political will to maintain safe humanitarian corridors. Despite the UN Secretary General’s call for a global 
ceasefire to help control COVID-19, the UN Security Council has failed to agree on a resolution to implement 
it, nor a way to ensure cross-border access for humanitarian assistance to populations trapped in conflict 
settings. Security Council members have, for example, in January 2020, failed to extend the cross-border 
authorisation to move aid supplies from Iraq to North-East Syria through the Yaroubiya crossing point,41 a 
decision which increases the fragility of a health system decimated by nine years of conflict, at a point when 
local authorities need to prepare for a potential COVID-19 epidemic. During active conflicts, certain health 
facilities may also be attacked, or be off-limits to some men, especially soldiers, highlighting the risks to 
accessibility of limiting COVID-19 services (such as quarantine) to only some health facilities. 
STIGMATISATION OF OUTSIDERS AND THE INCREASED MARGINALISATION OF VULNERABLE 
GROUPS 
As has been the case around the world, COVID-19 has created acute fears of contagion and created stigma 
around human movement. Globally, migrant populations have been stigmatized, scapegoated and neglected 
in the emergency response to COVID-19.42 In Lebanon, there are some reports of Syrian refugees coming 
from border-spaces being refused secondary healthcare at hospitals, because they are believed to carry the 
virus. Hygiene-related arguments are also a common tactic used by warring parties to exacerbate existing 
tensions with enemy groups,43 which COVID-19 could contribute to. 
Myths about migrants as disease carriers are not supported by the available evidence and ignore the critical 
contributions that migration makes to global economies.23 Nevertheless, when forcibly displaced people are 
imagined as carriers of disease it creates short-term protection issues for their safety if host populations 
distrust them. Previous epidemics have shown that stigmatising disease transmission only further places 
stigmatised populations at risk and reduces their access to care.44 Inciting stigma aimed at foreigners or 
minority groups undermines trust in community engagement efforts which are needed for an effective, 
whole-of-society epidemic response.45 Such sentiments can also negatively impact the longer term goal of 
social inclusion as outlined in the Global Compact on Refugees. Stigma is hard to undo.46 It is therefore 
important that all actors working on WASH and other interventions with displaced populations during COVID-
19 are aware of disease discourses being used to ‘other’ migrant or enemy groups to avoid unintentionally 
exaggerating these stereotypes. 
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In contrast, in many parts of East Africa, rural populations including displaced people have tended to fear 
foreigners including aid workers and people in capital cities including politicians as carriers of COVID-19.47 
With these individuals coming from elite classes and even positions of authority in COVID-19 responses, they 
are less vulnerable to discrimination and social exclusion. Rather, fear of people perceived to carry disease 
in this context is more likely to take the form of resistance to public health measures and political messages, 
building on long-standing centre-periphery grievances, wealth inequalities and lack of engagement in 
national processes. Such resistance, however, also puts displaced people at further risk of enforcement-
related violence. Particularly in conflict-affected places, therefore, discussions about lack of trust in political 
and healthcare systems and community engagement initiatives should be carefully considered in light of 
countries’ histories of using the public health system to exercise power, including through quarantine 
practices and lockdowns.48  
LIVELIHOODS AND ACCESS TO AID UNDER LOCKDOWN  
What is sometimes referred to as ‘resilience’ in the development and humanitarian sectors encompasses a 
wide range of strategies developed over time to build and rebuild one’s life in adverse situations. To cope 
with the economic insecurity of war and forced displacement, people tend to create livelihood ‘systems’49 
exploiting a diverse repertoire of coping strategies and transnational income streams accessed through social 
networks including savings and capital, mutual assistance, aid, education and work opportunities. The 
multiple avenues used by migrants to cope with displacement means that they cannot be considered as 
exclusively ‘aid-dependent’ or ‘self-reliant’. While no single strategy or income stream may be robust in times 
of crisis, a diversified approach is potentially more resilient and reflective of the realities of a globalised 
economy.50  
Quarantines and travel lockdowns are negatively impacting nearly all livelihood strategies, immobilizing the 
structures that displaced people use to cope with crisis and compounding vulnerabilities associated with 
displacement. Restrictions on people's ability to secure income from informal employment and lack of access 
to ‘safety nets’ in host countries could put more pressure on humanitarian aid and remittances, which are 
also threatened by the financial implications of the pandemic. Moreover, disruptions to education due to 
schools and university closure under lockdown have both immediate consequences on well-being (such as 
lack of access to services provided through schools) and longer-term implications amplifying inequalities in 
peoples’ abilities to build careers. 
Jobs: IDPs and refugees are more often dependent on insecure and informal employment than non-displaced 
people,22 depending on daily wages for subsistence, so have fewer savings, employment benefits and 
support from workers’ unions to sustain these financial shocks.51 COVID-19 lockdowns have worsened 
restrictions on displaced peoples’ movements to pursue work outside of camps in Kenya, Jordan and the 
Occupied Palestinians Territories. Monitoring from UNHCR has reported that amongst IDPs surveyed in Iraq, 
89% reported loss of employment since the COVID-19 pandemic began, and in Lebanon, the share of 
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respondents reporting ‘not to have any household member currently working’ increased drastically from 44 
per cent to 70 per cent between March and May 2020.52 With lockdowns in Lebanon implemented in the 
midst of a financial crisis, where there was already a dearth of job opportunities and increased numbers of 
people have accumulated debts, everyone is affected by the crisis, but for Syrian refugees, this is yet another 
crisis within the crisis. Daily wages have been devalued by the collapse of the Lebanese Lira and prices of 
basic goods have spiralled, while there have been reports of refugees facing difficulties withdrawing cash 
assistance due to bank restrictions.53 Inside some of the Palestinian camps, lockdown measures have largely 
reinforced pre-existing movement restrictions implemented for security reasons and the economic hardship 
induced by recent employment restrictions rules for foreigners (including Palestinian refugees) dating from 
June 2019. Post-lockdown, forcibly displaced populations may face discrimination in accessing the same 
livelihood opportunities as before the epidemic and a heightened risk of labour exploitation.54 
Food: Food prices have also increased exponentially in East Africa at the same time as stay-at-home orders 
have harmed peoples’ capacity to provide for themselves. In already economically-depressed and food 
insecure South Sudan, hungry people without access to land or other productive resources may be forced to 
reorganize their livelihoods dramatically or migrate in search of food, work or aid.54 Recent reports indicate 
that refugees and IDPs in Lebanon and Iraq cope with recent financial difficulties by reducing food purchases 
and changing their food consumption.52 
International aid: Restrictions on access to nearby markets have damaging consequences for people living 
in camps who are reliant on petty trade for income. While camps and settlements serve as a useful way to 
organise populations to deliver humanitarian aid, the chronic underfunding of the global humanitarian 
response system means that people living in camps rarely receive enough food or cash to meet their daily 
needs. Financing COVID-19 responses and maintaining commitments for ongoing humanitarian crises, 
including emergency relief for vulnerable people, has challenged most humanitarian actors and 
governments. Aid to South Sudanese refugee settlements in Uganda, for example, was reduced by 30% in 
April.55 Here, business women who can no longer sell goods in the market have been advised to ‘go back’ to 
agriculture. Uganda has a long history of constraining the repertoire of refugee survival strategies and 
expecting refugees to be self-reliant through farming, despite not providing refugees with enough land of 
sufficient quality to do so. Not only does this feel like a return to old ways of discussing refugee well-being, 
such advice is quite impractical given how swiftly both livelihoods and rations have been impacted. 
Government relief: The African Union has pointed out that most states have not considered the needs of 
migrants in their national COVID-19 responses.56 In Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia, refugees, asylum-
seekers and migrants have been left out of host governments’ vulnerability criteria for government-led food 
distributions.57 While UNHCR has concentrated their efforts on camps and settlements, emergency initiatives 
to distribute cash to urban refugees have been much slower and have achieved incomplete coverage, leaving 
many refugees stranded without food or drinkable water.  
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Remittances and neighbourhood savings: Loss of remittances from relatives abroad, also unable to work, is 
expected to further exacerbate vulnerabilities in forcibly displaced populations.58 Some local communal 
financing mechanisms have become dormant.59  
Enrichment of police and security forces: Lockdown measures are not only harming displaced peoples’ 
ability to earn incomes by restricting markets and movements. In some areas, security and police forces are 
using COVID-19 public health measures as an opportunity to profit from rule-breakers. These activities are 
exposing poor people to violence. In Rumbek, South Sudan, the military have fined and beaten people for 
violating travel restrictions as well as business people which do not have wash basins outside their stalls.b In 
Kenya around Dadaab refugee camp, police have been arresting people who don’t have the ‘right’ facemasks 
for travel, and refugees in Nairobi have been caught up in police harassment, extortion and violence 
associated with enforcing curfews.60  
SURVEILLANCE AND THREATS TO MOBILITY AND SAFE PLACES 
Displaced peoples' relative lack of long-distance mobility has been highlighted as a protective factor against 
COVID-19 transmission in low-income settings.61 Movements are nevertheless dynamic within settlements, 
across borders and between border entry points, camps or settlements and towns. Given the ways families 
decide to settle and move to deal with crisis, mobility itself can be seen as a coping measure threatened by 
COVID-19 lockdowns and surveillance measures. Moreover, as highly visible sites inhabited by displaced 
people, camps and borders typically attract political attention which is adding to the complexity of 
understanding COVID-19-related protection needs, exacerbating racism and xenophobia,62 and contributing 
to unequal imposition of lockdown measures. 
Surveillance effects in camps: Camps have been described as a “privileged space for feeding, protecting, and 
controlling”63 refugees and IDPs because of a combination of state poverty and security concerns, 
underpinned by foreign aid opportunities. These qualities make surveillance of camp residents for a range of 
purposes easier, which can generate new vulnerabilities.64 South Sudanese people outside of UN PoCs have 
noted with dismay that COVID-19 tests are absent from the usual places they would seek healthcare. Tests 
have been largely only available to Juba-based government epidemic response teams.65 Humanitarian actors 
were, however, able to organise testing for a suspected cluster of cases that emerged in a UN POC in May. 
Greater ability to test encamped people meant cases became visible here more quickly than in neighbouring 
communities, though community transmission was suspected. This bolstered an earlier decision by national 
security forces to close the gates to prevent transmission from the POCs to the wider population. Closure of 
 
b Interviews 
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the gates, however, created new protection challenges as people living in these sites are dependent for their 
survival on UN staff and humanitarians trucking in food and water.  
Surveillance effects at borders: Use of security surveillance resources to enable the crossing of borders have 
also affected vulnerabilities. The border between North-West Syria and Turkey has been closed to Syrians 
seeking refuge in Turkey since 2016. However, exceptions have typically been made for patients with critical 
conditions like cancer to seek medical care.66 In March 2020, lockdown measures implemented by the 
Turkish government mean that crossing the border is no longer an option for Syrian patients, which threatens 
transnational health seeking practices that have developed over time.67 This measure is particularly affecting 
people recently displaced by the military campaign on Idlib by Russia and the Syrian government. Here, 
health facilities have been bombed, but the violence and politics of the conflict means that Damascus is also 
not available as a safe space, leaving most patients in North-West Syria stranded without access to 
specialised healthcare.  
In most countries of East Africa, screening and quarantine measures were implemented early on in the 
epidemic to enable migration and control potential transmission from international travellers as well as large 
numbers of lorry drivers bringing in essential goods. The same sorts of provisions have not always been made 
available to forcibly displaced people. Partial or complete border closures affect asylum-seekers in all 
countries of the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region with refugee registration processes typically only 
available to asylum-seekers already in the country.14 In Uganda, some refugee reception centres have instead 
been converted into COVID-19 quarantine facilities to serve refugee and host area populations.40 Migration 
at informal border crossing points has nevertheless continued both by people who are already registered in 
camps and those who intend to. Elsewhere, border lockdowns have reinvigorated the smuggling of people 
and cash as a source of military-security income.68 Without registration, asylum-seekers do not have access 
to services provided by UNHCR and its implementing partners including food and healthcare. They can also 
not register for telephone sim cards to communicate and receive mobile money transfers. Moreover, border 
closures prevent the sorts of ‘self-reliant’ transnational economic activities that people claiming refugee 
assistance are not supposed to engage in. While in early June, the Ugandan government lifted most lockdown 
restrictions on movement to enable commerce in the centre of the country, including the capital, they 
remain in place in rural border districts where most refugee settlements are located.14 
Surveillance of strangers: In refugee settlements in Uganda, there is an understanding of why people who 
have crossed borders during the lockdown need to ‘hide’ in the community, but there is also fear that those 
migrants may facilitate the transmission of COVID-19. Groups of refugee youths are now patrolling informal 
crossing points at rivers and in forests in Adjumani at night when Ugandan border authorities are not active, 
and settlement residents are reportedly highly attuned to the entry of strangers into the settlements. Such 
an improvised ‘surveillance’ system, which primarily aims to identify (and punish) outsiders who pose a risk 
of disease transmission –rather than to identify symptomatic cases as in public health strategies– has 
emerged during many other epidemics on the continent, including during the West African Ebola crisis.69 
KEY CONSIDERATIONS: COVID-19 AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EAST AFRICA 
Contact: a.wilkinson@ids.ac.uk 
14 
Such behaviour can be seen as an understandable part of the communal place-making process displaced 
people engage in to defend their new homes which they have invested in. This type of surveillance strategy 
for COVID-19, however, may create additional vulnerabilities which should be monitored, such as the 
potential for incarceration of migrants in unsafe conditions or mob violence directed towards those seen as 
putting the safety of camps at risk. 
RISKS OF INDUCING FURTHER INVOLUNTARY DISPLACEMENTS 
As described above, in many ways, forcibly-displaced people’s use of mobility as a coping measure has 
become more difficult amidst public health responses to COVID-19. These measures have also created 
conditions which may nevertheless prompt new forced and unsafe migrations. 
Emptying camps: In South Sudan, newly displaced populations sheltering in churches in Wau and Yei areas 
have been asked by church authorities to move and live with relatives or seek refuge in nearby POC camps, 
partly because they don’t want to encourage social gatherings that could spread COVID-19. Meanwhile, 
mechanisms for reducing the population in POCs across the country have been a preoccupation of the UN 
and government departments since they were created in 2013. As the COVID-19 crisis loomed in March 2020, 
UNMISS staff “very strongly encouraged people in the POCS to return home” to rural areas where people are 
assumed to have ancestral ties. The reduced connectivity and wider spacing between homes in villages were 
also presumed to make people safer from transmission.70 But for most residents, the assertion that they 
should go home is nonsensical, impractical and could push them towards dangerously violent realities. No 
POC residents’ ‘home’ has remained unchanged. Many residents have grown up in urban centres or moved 
there from sites of exile during the 1980s and 1990s. Emptying camps during a pandemic which has caused 
economic hardship for so many others across the country will add to the numbers of hungry people on the 
move and add to the demands on poor rural people’s food supplies. It would also likely contribute to conflicts 
over land which have driven the war so far. 
Reduction in peace-keeping efforts: As in many areas of the Middle East and East Africa, there is also a risk 
of new conflict-driven migrations if international peace-keeping efforts cannot be maintained through global 
travel restrictions for COVID-19. A likely consequence of retreating peacebuilding activities is that non-state 
armed groups will seize the opportunity to expand their frontiers, thus undermining ongoing peace 
processes. It also opens up the possibility of increased mortality in the context of violent conflicts. For 
displaced people wanting to return home, COVID-19-related delays to peace-keeping is yet another 
disappointing set-back, as poignantly captured by social media messages by images circulating on social 
media showing Syrians carrying signs reading “Stay at home, I wish I could!’.71 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE LOCALISATION OF COVID-
19 RESPONSES 
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Amidst insecurity, insufficient funding, mobility restrictions and uncertainty around how best to respond to 
this novel threat, displaced populations, humanitarian actors and governments are mounting responses to 
COVID-19 across sites of forced migration in the Middle East and East Africa. Importantly, many of these 
responses have built on existing local social and aid delivery structures particular to the displacement context 
(see Box 1). 
These have included: drawing on communication channels that displaced people actively maintain to 
politicians and humanitarian agencies to obtain COVID-19 information; leveraging the legitimacy of and 
relationships between medical providers to coordinate responses across fragmented systems; and building 
on long-term relationships between providers and patients to maintain remote services for people with 
chronic conditions. Refugee-led organisations have also functioned as important actors in solidarity networks 
to address the gaps and limitations of existing international aid and host government support systems in 
providing food relief for self-settled groups.  
Box 1. Examples of local initiatives to respond to COVID-19, highlighting the social relations that responses 
built on 
Obtaining information for COVID-19 education & 
advocacy: In August 2018, violent clashes broke 
out in a UN POC for IDPs among ethnic Nuer people 
aligned to different vice-presidents in South 
Sudan, leading to one group leaving the camp en 
masse for Mangateen settlement, a government-
managed site for IDPs on unused land outside of 
the city.72 Among several popular explanations for 
the move was the idea that this minority group was 
supported financially through charity and 
patronage networks by one of the wealthiest 
politicians in the country, and so should not be 
receiving UN aid.73 When rumours of the cluster of 
COVID-19 cases in the POC reached Mangateen, 
residents used different channels that they had 
developed during their move to find out more 
information on behalf of the settlement. One was 
a channel to the politicians linked to the earlier 
clash who had direct experience of the disease. So 
many of the country’s leadership had become 
infected with the virus that the entire COVID-19 
taskforce was self-isolating.74 Another channel 
Coordinating responses across fragmented 
systems: In both Syria and Lebanon, healthcare 
governance is highly fragmented but frontline 
medical workers have been key to ensuring 
responses to COVID-19 are coordinated. In Syria’s 
opposition-held province of Idlib, the civil society-
led health directorate has taken the lead in 
coordinating a COVID-19 task force through which 
NGOs, international agencies, volunteer rescue 
workers and opposition groups are implementing 
COVID-19 preparedness activities for its besieged 
population, half of whom are displaced.77 In a 
context where so many actors are in dispute over 
territory, the local and international legitimacy of 
the medical doctors leading the directorate has 
been key to enabling coordination and 
fundraising.77 Grounded coordination is also key 
within and around Ein-El-Helwe Palestinian 
refugee camp in Lebanon. Staff from the Ministry 
of Public Health, UN agencies, international and 
local NGOs and first aid responders have 
collaborated to reach communities with 
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involved women’s groups and camp chairmen who 
had been seen as ‘neutral’ in the POC clashes and 
were good communicators with multiple 
constituencies in multiple languages. They had 
developed good relations with some NGOs who 
had agreed to provide outreach services to the 
new settlement. Through these interactions, 
Mangateen’s leaders were able to disseminate 
information about the symptoms that some of the 
first cases of COVID-19 in the country were feeling 
--such as losing a sense of smell75 and feeling a 
swelling in the chest76-- and they continue to 
advocate for services for the settlement.  
educational material via social media, adapt the 
physical spaces of ambulances and hospital 
entryways to protect staff and patients from 
infections, and reinforce referral systems to 
transfer patients when the main hospital inside 
the camp becomes overwhelmed. Each of these 
issues have been recognised to affect people and 
systems inside and outside the camp and the 
innovations adopted are being translated as much 
as possible across systems.  
Going remote with disease management and 
support: Health services addressing chronic 
conditions which involve long-term relationships 
between providers and patients have been 
particularly targeted for remote management 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. A key challenge 
encountered when ‘going remote’78 in insecure 
settings such as Somalia, South Sudan, Iraq and 
Syria has been the tendency to lose sight of 
realities on the ground including an awareness of 
the power relations affecting access to services, as 
well as the risk of overburdening in-country local 
partners who also bear high security risks.79 Efforts 
by one international NGO to offer physical 
rehabilitation services via video link for Syrian 
refugees in Turkey have therefore focused on 
simplifying standard operating procedures and 
creating transparent patient selection approaches. 
Agencies are also building on community models 
of care to deliver drugs through peer or patient 
groups.80 This approach relies on peer groups to 
identify and help solve ongoing social, medical and 
logistical challenges their members face. It has 
been presented as an option to enable individuals 
at high-risk of developing complications of COVID-
Responding to hunger: In both Uganda and 
Lebanon, refugee-led organisations have helped 
fill gaps in state and humanitarian social 
protection by identifying vulnerable households in 
need of emergency food relief, advocating to their 
networks to help fund relief and procuring and 
distributing food. In Uganda, three months into 
the lockdown, less than 10% of urban refugee 
households had been reached with emergency 
cash by UNHCR because of a lack of funding and 
means to reach refugees outside of settlements.32 
Refugee-led organisations have assisted UNHCR 
verification exercises in urban areas and used their 
visibility in the Global Refugee-Led Network to 
advocate for more rapid responses. Though 
modest in scale, RLOs have also mounted their 
own emergency food distributions using funds 
collected from individuals, INGOs and some donor 
support. In the Palestinian refugee spaces of 
Lebanon and Jordan, there is a sense that 
enduring hardship has created a sense of 
communal trust and preparedness for COVID-19.9 
To a certain extent, solidarity is being claimed as 
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19, such as refugees or IDPs living with a chronic 
disease, to continue their treatment under 
lockdowns or while being shielded from 
transmission. 
an alternative to humanitarian assistance,81  with 
food banks largely locally funded. 
 
STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES TO LOCALISING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
Despite recent global commitments to localise humanitarian aid,82 and WHO COVID-19 guidance which 
advises that displaced people should be “recognized as co-developers as well as providers of health and other 
essential services and prevention efforts”,83 however, refugees and IDPs have nevertheless often been 
marginalised from disease control decision-making at all levels of the response. Their exclusion stems from 
legal and normative practices of host community governments, professional societies and humanitarian 
partners with consequences for the overall effectiveness of the COVID-19 response. Examples include: 
◼ Limited participation of displaced people in COVID-19 task forces: In Uganda, refugee organisations 
have been excluded from COVID-19 response task forces at both national and district levels, even in 
places where refugees outnumber the host population. In many countries, the lack of consultation of 
displaced populations about the imposition and lifting of lockdown measures along borders and in camps 
and how they could be adapted is particularly problematic, given how much vulnerability these 
measures have created specifically for these groups. 
◼ Legal barriers to registering refugee-led organisations: In Lebanon and elsewhere, organisations led by 
refugees face substantial legal and administrative obstacles preventing them from receiving direct 
funding, particularly if their staff are undocumented refugees.84 Even in settings where local 
organisations are not discouraged by national governments, they may be at a disadvantage in competing 
with international organisations and must survive on very small operating budgets.85 These obstacles 
prevent refugee- and IDP-led organisations from taking a larger role in response efforts. 
◼ Exclusion of displaced healthcare workers from humanitarian responses: Despite the need for greater 
health human resources in a pandemic, many IDP and refugee workers are excluded from humanitarian 
and government responses because of local hiring laws and norms. Such practices conceal 
uncomfortable structural political questions on the representation of refugees in health systems and 
society.86 Whereas other regions of the world have addressed this issue through rapid credentialing 
schemes for migrant healthcare workers,87 public health responses to COVID-19 in the Middle East and 
East Africa appear to be overlooking the capacities of displaced HCWs, especially to build culturally 
sensitive healthcare programmes for patients through trusting relationships.88  
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HOW TO ADDRESS VULNERABILITIES OF DISPLACED POPULATIONS 
THROUGH LOCALISED COVID-19 RESPONSES 
Addressing vulnerability to epidemics in forcibly displaced populations who have witnessed violence, 
experienced extreme hardship and already had to rebuild their lives multiple times is a complex task. The 
coping systems which populations displaced by war have built up are fragile and humanitarian responses 
should take care not to harm the social relationships, networks and systems which populations turn to in 
times of crisis. Furthermore, international responders and actors from capital cities are having difficulties 
reaching displaced populations with public health interventions and peace-making initiatives. To address 
current and future vulnerabilities in such a context, social science research and the participation of local 
actors will be key to identifying emerging vulnerabilities, creating feasible and appropriate strategies to 
address them, and delivering assistance. The COVID-19 pandemic therefore provides a unique opportunity 
to support and further localise responses. 
We offer the following recommendations on how humanitarian agencies and governments can support local 
actors during this pandemic to reduce vulnerabilities created by COVID-19: 
Promote holistic public health responses which address multiple vulnerabilities related to COVID-19: 
COVID-19 is exposing the limitations of humanitarian protection systems to provide safety, protect 
livelihoods and deliver durable solutions for forcibly-displaced populations.6 COVID-19 responses should 
acknowledge the multiple sources of trauma forcibly displaced populations have already experienced and 
ensure that displaced populations are not pushed into even more precarious situations by public health 
measures. A holistic approach enables solutions to public health problems without endangering existing 
coping strategies, for example, by: 
◼ Avoiding imposing complete lockdowns for conflict-affected and displaced populations to minimise 
economic hardships and violence and finding ways to adapt agricultural production.89 For example, less 
restrictive strategies such as adopting queuing systems and alternating days for individual vendors can 
help maintain safe physical distances in outdoor markets that enable some trade.90  As few displaced 
people are exclusively ‘aid-dependent’ or ‘self-reliant’, global donors should also continue to give 
generously to humanitarian funding mechanisms to support displaced people in precarious economic 
circumstances. Humanitarian and local actors should invest in emergency financial protection systems 
which can reach self-settled refugees in exceptional circumstances. 
◼ Protecting peoples’ existing homes and safe spaces and work with them to become safer from COVID-
19 transmission. Displaced people should not be asked to leave camps, settlements and other sites 
where they have sought sanctuary during an epidemic, especially if they cannot do so safely. Health 
facilities which serve large displaced populations should not be entirely given over to COVID-19 activities 
unless alternative service provision arrangements can be made and are communicated about clearly. 
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Likewise, alternative arrangements should be made to maintain asylum activities if reception centres 
are repurposed for the COVID-19 response. 
◼ Ensuring border controls balance needs to control COVID-19 transmission and protect peoples’ right to 
asylum so that entry is safe for everyone.91 People fleeing war in an epidemic still need protection, 
regardless of real or perceived fears of COVID-19. For undocumented refugees, every effort should also 
be made to enable temporary amnesties to access health services without putting refugees at risk of 
being arrested or deported. These measures will require cross-sectoral and multi-level responses to 
protect the lives and futures of forcibly displaced persons. 
Use research to tailor responses: COVID-19 responses should incorporate social science research and 
vulnerability assessments to adapt interventions and ensure they reflect the diverse realities and political 
contexts of displacement. Research in previous epidemics has highlighted the critical importance of 
understanding local social responses to the epidemic, consulting people affected by interventions to find the 
best ways of adapting them, identifying response priorities including non-medical needs, and engaging 
representatives who are trusted by communities in decision-making.90,92-94  Research can also be used to 
identify local groups and individuals best placed to overcome political tensions driving armed conflict, liaise 
with international aid groups and provide local insight to the vulnerabilities that standard approaches are 
not addressing.85 Special care should be taken in a remote programming approach to monitor power 
relations and intervention effects on frontline workers.95-96 
Adopt a whole-of-society approach to COVID-19: The WHO emphasizes a whole of society approach to 
control COVID-19.83 In settings of forced displacement, this means that:  
◼ Multiple sectors and stakeholders should be involved in the response, including the various and 
legitimate forms of local authorities (such as elected representatives, hereditary chiefs, religious and 
civil society organisations) which govern displaced populations and enable coping and participation in 
social life. Bypassing or discrediting them could otherwise have damaging effects in post-pandemic 
times. Initiatives which value the skills and context-specific knowledge of displaced healthcare providers 
to engage with patients who are similarly displaced can potentially be powerful in an epidemic like 
COVID-19, where trust and localisation are key to successfully implementing any public health measure.  
◼ Perspectives from different forms and waves of displacement should be welcomed. Partnerships 
encouraged with diaspora and local groups involved in humanitarian response in ways that the 
comparative advantages of these actors are complemented and built on for the benefit of all.97 Involving 
diaspora and refugee-led groups may be especially important to improve support to displaced people 
not living in formal settlements, though care should be taken to understand who certain groups 
represent, whose voices may remain marginalised within these structures and how strategies can be 
adapted to reflect the diversity of forcibly displaced people within and across borders.98-99   
◼ Coordination between different types of actors should be supported. While not always possible in 
conflict settings where IDPs flee government persecution, coordination between governments and civil 
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society actors should be prioritised so that forcibly displaced populations are not adversely affected by 
state-level decision-making. 
Support organisations led by forcibly displaced people: There are several steps that can be taken now to 
support the work of and increase the capacities of local civil society organisations led by forcibly displaced 
people who are already participating in COVID-19 responses. These include: 
◼ Funding, supporting and working with existing networks of organisations for displaced people such as 
the Global Refugee-Led Network; 
◼ Building-in processes and funds for local organisations of displaced people to participate in meetings at 
local, national, regional and global level, including by helping procure communications technologies and 
licenses;100  
◼ Increasing direct financial support to local organisations within displaced communities to properly 
compensate humanitarian work done by local actors and investing in long-term strategic partnerships. 
The acute need to localise activity in the COVID-19 crisis provides a window of opportunity to re-examine 
refugees’ and undocumented migrants’ right to work, particularly in humanitarian responses aimed to 
meet their needs;  
◼ Granting local organisations exemptions from lockdown measures to provide essential services to their 
members; 
◼ Adopting fair and accountable approaches to assessing gaps in capacity organisations may face to 
response to the COVID-19 crisis101 and providing technical support when needed; 
◼ Sharing existing and generate new evidence of good practices in capacity strengthening to encourage a 
collective approach to capacity strengthening.101 
Support local peace-making and ceasefire efforts: Perspectives from war torn places highlight the need for 
COVID-19 responses to be conflict- and peace-sensitive (e.g., avoid exacerbating, and ideally contribute to 
reducing the risk of violence and conflict)102 as well as the need for global actions to support ceasefires to 
ameliorate the conditions which lead to forced displacement. Existing vulnerabilities created by conflicts and 
displacement intersect with those created by epidemics, making it difficult for effective public health 
interventions to stop the spread of the disease.3 Particularly while international travel restrictions are in 
place, it is important that stakeholders adopt mechanisms that will sustain peacebuilding efforts by 
supporting national and local capacities for peace.103 
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CONTACT 
If you have a direct request concerning the response to COVID-19, regarding a brief, tools, additional 
technical expertise or remote analysis, or should you like to be considered for the network of advisers, please 
contact the Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform by emailing Annie Lowden (a.lowden@ids.ac.uk) 
or (oliviatulloch@anthrologica.com).  Key Platform liaison points include: UNICEF (nnaqvi@unicef.org); IFRC 
(ombretta.baggio@ifrc.org); and GOARN Research Social Science Group (nina.gobat@phc.ox.ac.uk). 
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